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ABSTRACT 
 
This paper looks to revive and advance dialogue surrounding John Nijenhuis’ case against 
‘existence language’ as a rendering of Aquinas’ esse. Nijenhuis presented both a 
semantic/grammatical case for abandoning this practice as well as a more systematic argument 
based on his reading of Thomist metaphysics. On one hand, I affirm the important distinction 
between being and existence and lend qualified support to his interpretation of the 
quantitiative/qualitative correlation between esse and essentia in Aquinas’ texts. On the other hand, 
I take issue with Nijenhuis’ relegation of exist(ence) to a second-rate ontological principle, and to 
this end undertake a brief historical and etymological survey, noting its emergence in Greek thought 
(u9pa/rxein, u3parcij), its translation into medieval Latin (ex(s)istere, ex(s)istentia) and thus 
something of the pedigree of this terminology in modern usage. I conclude with some brief remarks 
on the task of exegeting Aquinas vis-à-vis the revivification of contemporary metaphysical 
ontology in general. 
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Just over a decade ago, a lively debate sprang up primarily in American Catholic Philosophical 
Quarterly concerning the common practice in Thomist scholarship of translating esse (and indeed 
ei]nai) by “existence” and its cognates.1 At the time, the instigator of the discussion, John Nijenhuis, 
prosecuted a strong case against this practice. However, the dialogue between Nijenhuis and his 
interlocutors, Russell Pannier and Thomas Sullivan, ended abruptly with the conclusion that, as 
Nijenhuis put it at the time, “our visions are worlds apart, philosophically and ‘metaphysically’ … 
we speak and think in two different languages”.2 In what follows I would like to both revive and 
then further this unfortunately truncated discussion. My reasons for wanting to do so are twofold. 
First, Nijenhuis raised here an issue of great importance not only for Thomist scholarship in 
particular, but for the future of metaphysical ontology in general. Second, I believe that there is 
great potential for the conversation to be pushed much further than was the case a decade ago on the 
basis of something much closer to the shared “vision” and a common “language” that are needed if 
productive dialogue is to ensue.    
 
I begin by presenting a brief précis of Nijenhuis’ several articles from the period which, beyond 
semantic and grammatical reasons for abandoning the still quite widespread practice of translating 
Thomas’ esse by exist(ence), presents also a substantial metaphysical argument rooted in his 
quantitative/qualitative reading of the esse-essentia relationship in Aquinas. My response to 
Nijenhuis’ position is rather complex. First, I affirm his semantic/grammatical argument, one that 
                                                 
1 See articles by Nijenhuis: “‘To Be’ or ‘To Exist’: That Is the Question”. The Thomist 50, no. 3 (1986): 353-94; “‘Ens’ 
Described as ‘Being or Existent’”. American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 68, no. 1 (1994): 1-14; and “Existence 
vs. Being: An All-Important Matter of Terminology”. American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 69, no. 1 (1995): 89-
95. See also the responses to Nijenhuis by Pannier and Sullivan: “Being, Existence, and the Future of Thomistic 
Studies: A Reply to Professor Nijenhuis”. American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 69, no. 1, pp. 83-88, Winter 
1995. Note that in what follows I use the shorthand term “exist(ence)” to refer to “existence language” in general 
(including infinitive and substantive forms such as, respectively, “to exist” and “existence”). 
2 Nijenhuis, Existence vs. Being, 89. 
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has been made by several others in recent years (e.g., Cornelio Fabro3, Oliva Blanchette4 and to a 
limited extent John Knasas5). Second, I argue that insofar as his understanding of Aquinas is correct 
concerning the close quantitative/qualitative correlation between esse and essentia in his thought, 
then Nijenhuis’ absolute opposition to the use of exist(ence) language for esse is also to be 
affirmed. However, third, while Nijenhuis may be correct in his reading of Aquinas, I nonetheless 
take issue with his relegation of exist(ence) to a necessarily second-rate ontological principle, and to 
this end I look to highlight something of the dynamism and metaphysical complexity to be 
discovered through a careful etymological investigation of its semantic field. Accordingly, I trace 
the emergence of this terminology in late Greek thought (u9pa/rxein, u3parcij), its uneven 
translation into medieval Latin metaphysics (ex(s)istere and ex(s)istentia) and thus something of the 
pedigree of the modern and contemporary language of ‘to exist’ (existieren; exister) and existence 
(die Existenz; l’existence). I conclude with a few necessarily brief remarks on the obvious problems 
that are raised by a juxtaposition of the two ‘horns’ of my Nijenhuis interpretation, concerning the 
task of exegeting Aquinas vis-à-vis the context of contemporary metaphysical ontology in general.6 
 
The Case for Decoupling Being and Existence on the Basis of Semantics and Grammar 
Aquinas writes of a real distinction in the determinate being (ens) between essentia and esse. That 
there is a well-established practice of substituting exist(ence) for esse in translating and discussing 
Thomist texts, is beyond dispute. In his tellingly entitled 1947 work, Court traité de l'existence et de 
l'existant, Jacques Maritain writes of “this concept of existence [l’existence], of to-exist (esse)”7, 
                                                 
3 E.g., Fabro. “The Intensive Hermeneutics of Thomist Philosophy: The Notion of Participation”. Review of 
Metaphysics, vol. 27, Mar 1974, 450, 470. 
4 E.g., Blanchette. Philosophy of Being: A Reconstructive Essay in Metaphysics. Washington DC: Catholic University 
of America Press, 2003, 13, 90. 
5 E.g., Knasas. Bring and Some Twentieth Century Thomists. New York: Fordham University Press, 2003, 175. 
6 Both questions deserve significant papers unto themselves. However, if this paper can succeed in raising again the 
issue at hand and bringing it forward even to a small degree, this will be achievement enough. 
7 Maritain. Existence and the Existent. Translated by Lewis Galantiere and Gerald B Phelan. Garden City, New York: 
Image Books, 1956, 33. 
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and he regularly reinforces the purported equivalence of the actus essendi with the “act of 
existence” through direct allusion to the words of Aquinas himself.8 The consequence is the virtual 
proclamation of a doctrine of ipsum existere subsistens, as seen, for example, in Gilson’s claim that 
“God alone, Who is a pure act of existence, can cause an act of existence [l’existence]”.9 Two more 
recent figures who have routinely continued this practice are Joseph Owens10 and Norris Clarke, 
with the latter writing of “the essence-existence doctrine” as the “central piece of [Aquinas’] whole 
metaphysical system”.11 While generally far more circumspect in this regard, John Wippel also 
lapses into ‘existence talk’ on occasion,12 and the tendency is not unknown either in texts by John F 
X. Knasas, even in his most recent book in which he nonetheless labels this very practice as 
“unfortunate”.13 
 
Nijenhuis is vociferously opposed to this translatory and scholarly practice, and a close reading of 
his papers indicate both semantic/grammatical reasons for doing so, as well as a more substantial 
metaphysical reason. I will turn to the latter in a moment. Of his semantic/ grammatical case, he 
(and others) mention two main problems. The first of these concerns the pervasive tendency to 
translate an infinitive, esse, by a substantive, “existence” (l’existence, Existenz). Not only does this 
scholarly custom have the effect of pasting over the dynamic connotations of Aquinas’ esse, but it 
also opens the way toward an implicit reification of this supremely active principle. Accordingly, 
                                                 
8 See, e.g., his allusion to De Potentia Dei: 7, 2, ad 9; 223: “the act of existing is the act par excellence ... the act and the 
perfection of all form and all perfection. Hoc quod dico esse est actualitas omnium actuum, et propter hoc est perfectio 
omnium perfectionum” (Existence and the Existent, 45-46). 
9 Gilson. Being and Some Philosophers. Toronto: Garden City Press, 1952, 90. See also, Clarke, W. Norris. “What 
Cannot Be Said in St Thomas’ Essence-Existence Doctrine”. The New Scholasticism 48, no. 1 (1974), 19, 23-25, 33 and 
passim. 
10 See Owens. “Aquinas on Knowing Existence”. Review of Metaphysics 29 (1976), 670-90, which is filled with 
particularly blatant examples of this practice. 
11 “What Cannot Be Said”, 19. This language is continued in his most recent work: e.g., his talk of Aquinas’ real 
distinction between “an act of existence” and “a limiting essence” (The One and the Many: A Contemporary Thomistic 
Metaphysics. Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 2001, 80). 
12 See, e.g., Wippel. The Metaphysical Thought of Thomas Aquinas. Washington D.C.: Catholic University of America 
Press, 2000, 3. Later in the same text, he writes of “esse taken as actual existence, or as Thomas often expresses it, as 
the actus essendi (act of being)” (25). 
13 See Being and Some Twentieth Century Thomists, 211. Cf 175.   
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existence can quickly come to be thought of as a kind of property that can be possessed by an 
essence, by which it is made actual or real. The consequences of this kind of distortion of Thomist 
thought are well known. On one hand, there are questions concerning the “essence” of existence as 
the actualising principle of the being, a line of thought that raises the ghosts of late medieval 
debates around the infinite regress of principles of essence and existence.14 Blanchette is perhaps 
particularly alluding to this problem in his caveat that existence can be understood “as if it were … 
another quiddity” besides essence itself,15 and in a similar vein Nijenhuis warns that replacing the 
verb esse by the noun existentia risks “turning esse … into a kind of static receptacle into which 
‘beings’ are thrown”.16 On the other hand, this talk of a metaphysical principle of existence suggests 
Kant’s famous analogy of the hundred Thalers, a scenario in which being/existence is presented as a 
pseudo quality which can by definition add nothing to the thing, qua res. This is presumably the 
context of Fabro’s warning about confusing esse with a “modal distinction”17 by which he seems to 
be suggesting understanding esse in the light of Kant’s Wirklichkeit and thus as a merely “logical 
predicate”. In sum, the use of a substantive to translate an infinitive risks obscuring what is most 
distinctive about Aquinas’ notion of esse: i.e., its active and yet abyssal character; its complete 
otherness to essence, by which it is to be understood as radical act (through which the thing is per 
se) rather than simply as a quality or mode or state of the thing.   
 
The second problem is that since being and existence have quite distinct etymological roots, 
substituting exist(ence) for being amounts to a confusion of semantic fields. As will be seen shortly, 
the precise nature of the relationship between these two fields in terms of the history of usage in 
                                                 
14 The contributions of Giles of Rome and his kin on this issue are notorious. See, e.g.,  Wippel, Metaphysical Thought 
of Thomas Aquinas, 134ff . 
15 Blanchette, Philosophy of Being, 90. 
16 Nijenhuis, “‘Ens’ Described as ‘Being or Existent’”, 3fn. I leave to one side Nijenhuis’ badly misplaced reference 
here to Heidegger’s Geworfenheit in his allusion to a supposed “Heideggerian” notion of being “thrown” into such a 
“static [existential] receptacle”.  
17 Fabro, “Intensive Hermeneutics”, 450. 
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western metaphysics is extremely unclear. However, despite the extraordinarily ancient roots of this 
lack of clarity, one thing is clear: “to be” and “to exist”, ei]nai and u9pa/rxein,  esse and existere, are 
indeed different words arising from distinct roots and with their own quite different (albeit at times 
ambiguously overlapping) semantic fields. It therefore makes little sense for these highly 
metaphysically significant vocabularies to be used interchangeably as if they were virtually 
synonymous, even given the difficulties of translation involved. Nijenhuis is quite right to insist 
upon a higher level of scholarly care than is indicated by this practice, however well attested it is in 
the history of metaphysics.   
 
The Case for Decoupling Being and Existence on the Basis of Thomist Metaphysics 
Over and above this general contention, Nijenhuis also offers a relatively uniquely developed 
reading of Thomist metaphysics which leads him to conclude that Aquinas’ doctrine of esse has 
little to do with “existence” as such.  In order to explore his case, it will first be useful to backtrack 
a little. The preceding discussion about the danger of reification mentioned that for some scholars 
the substitution of existence for esse is to be associated with the reduction of esse to a state-like 
designation which merely indicates the fact of exist-ing rather than the act of being. Fabro, for 
example, argues that the language of exist(ence) corresponds to the mere “actuality” of a being 
rather than to its basic constitution as a being. Consequently, a precise understanding of Thomist 
ontology requires “distinguishing esse as act not only from essence which is its potency, but also 
from existence which is the fact of being and hence a ‘result’ rather than a metaphysical 
principle”.18 This is to insist on the distinction between esse as a cause and existence as the result.  
 
The problem with such a critique, however, is that Existential Thomism certainly does not simply 
stop at existence qua fact. Rather, all grammatical issues aside, it is clear that these scholars’ use of 
                                                 
18 Fabro, “Intensive Hermeneutics”, 470.  
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existential language is suffused with an eminently active sense appropriate for Aquinas’ esse. One 
need only look, for example, to Clarke’s description of “the act of existence by which … every real 
being … actually exists”19 as well as his strong emphasis on “being as active”20, to see how despite 
all inappropriate renderings, a strong sense of Aquinas’ esse qua act is nonetheless conveyed. The 
claim that Existential Thomism is, on the basis of its faulty translation of esse, involved in a simple 
confusion between acts (cause) and facts (results) is unsustainable. Words and meanings are not so 
two-dimensionally correlated. 
 
Nijenhuis’ more substantial case concerns his claim that the language of esse (as well as actualitas) 
is historically rooted in a “quantitative” sense not possessed by existere and its kin, and certainly 
absent from the contemporary language of exist(ence). This argument is linked, it seems, to the 
intensified interest in Thomist scholarship – championed by Fabro himself – into the influence of 
the Platonic participatory motif on Aquinas’ notion of esse.21 Nijenhuis argues that Aquinas’ esse is 
related less to the Aristotelian tradition (with its categories of du/namij and e0ne/rgeia) than to 
Plato’s ei]nai, in that both Plato and Aquinas understand beings as relative mixtures of being and 
non-being. Aquinas’ use of esse, therefore, must be understood in the context of varying levels of 
the perfection or “fullness” of acts, all of which are relative to the total fullness or perfection of God 
who is, of course, pure esse and the source of all finite beings who share (or participate in) this 
fullness. Nijenhuis sets out his textual evidence for this reading in some detail, attending especially 
to the quantitative/qualitative language Aquinas uses to discuss the participation of the ens in esse: 
e.g., “All entia … to the degree that [inquantum] they are entia … are in act [in actu]”,22 such that 
“some things participate more fully [quaedam perfectius] in esse; other things less fully [quaedam 
                                                 
19 Clarke, The One and the Many, 80 (emphasis added). Many other texts might also be offered. See, e.g., Maritain, 
Existence and the Existent, 74. 
20 See Clarke, The One and the Many, 294, where he even raises this principle in Aquinas to a virtual “transcendental”. 
21 It is important to note that Existential Thomists are among those who have also strongly pointed out this link. See, 
e.g., Clarke, The One and the Many, chapter 5 and passim. 
22 De Veritate., q.21, a. 2. 
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imperfectius]”.23  And again, “[t]o the degree that a creature approaches God, to that extent does it 
possess being [quantum – tantum habet de esse]; but to the degree that it is removed from God, to 
that extent it is affected with nonbeing [habet de non esse]”.24  
 
This, then, is for Nijenhuis the deepest reason for the inappropriateness of using existential 
language for Aquinas’ esse. Even if exist(ence) is understood in a purportedly active sense, it 
cannot also be understood in a quantitative/qualitative sense. Beings can only be said to exist or not 
exist; they cannot be said to “exist to some extent”. As such, exist(ence) is an irretrievably locative 
notion: i.e., things are said to “be there”, as opposed to “not being there”, or being absent. In sum, 
exist(ence) is “an all-or-nothing notion”,25 and thus contrasts sharply with being, that is able to be 
possessed in degrees of intensity and perfection. In making this claim, Nijenhuis argues against 
both some standard translations of Aquinas and the claims of Existential Thomists themselves such 
as Gilson. 26 
 
Nijenhuis’ reading of Aquinas on this point deeply influences his understanding of the relationship 
between esse and essentia. Albeit only in a footnote, Nijenhuis enthusiastically recommends the 
work of John A. Peters who some time earlier had taken this argument further still by portraying 
essence as a virtual function of the relative fullness of the being’s participation in esse; i.e., of 
essence as a qualitative correlate of the (quantitative) degree of esse possessed by the ens, by virtue 
of its participation in the Divine fullness. Peters put it this way: “The all-embracing nature of [esse] 
means that it constitutes also all contents, all essences. An essence … has value only because it 
                                                 
23 From De substantiis separatis; quoted in Nijenhuis, “‘To Be’ or ‘To Exist’”, 371. 
24 De Veritate., q.21, a. 2; quoted in Nijenhuis, “‘Ens’ Described as ‘Being or Existent’”, 8. Other passages cited by 
Nijenhuis concerning esse as quantitative in this sense include ST: 1, 20, 2; 1, 5, 3; 1, 48, 2; De Potentia Dei: q. 1, a 2; 
q. 5, a. 8; q. 3, a. 4; and De Ver: 2, 3, 16.  
25 Nijenhuis, “‘To Be’ or ‘To Exist’”, 357. 
26 See Nijenhuis, “‘To Be’ or ‘To Exist’”, 384ff and 363f, fn 33 (and 389) respectively. 
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contains more or less [esse]; because it indicates the measure in which a being participates in 
[esse]”.27  
 
This qualitative/quantitative conception of the esse-essentia relationship in the ens is deserving of a 
great deal more attention than it can be given here, and indeed than it has thus far received within 
Thomist scholarship in general.28 Suffice to say that to the extent that this reading is judged to be an 
accurate interpretation of Thomist texts, doubt will justifiably be cast over the continued practice of 
using the language of exist(ence) as a convenient substitute for Aquinas’ being (esse). In what 
follows, however, I hold this question somewhat in abeyance in order to undertake a fresh 
examination of the pedigree of existential terminology.    
 
An Etymological Reclamation of the Depth-dimension of Exist(ence) 
In what follows, I reject Nijenhuis’ claim (shared, as has been seen, by Fabro, Blanchette and 
others), that while the language of being is to be extolled for its etymological and semantic richness 
and metaphysical depth, exist(ence) is to be viewed as a second-rate ontological principle insofar as 
it denotes mere “thereness”. It is in this context that I present a very different reading of the 
category of exist(ence) within the western metaphysical tradition, by looking to reclaim its active 
sense and indeed its depth-dimension. And I should say at the outset that in what follows, I am 
deeply indebted to the still seminal work of Charles Kahn for his detailed etymological insights into 
these matters. 
 
In Greek, the semantics of exist(ence) are closely connected to the category of a0rxh/, and this sense 
of origin or foundation clearly emerges in the verb, u9pa/rxein (to exist), which originally meant “to 
                                                 
27 Peters, Metaphysics: A Systematic Survey. Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1963, 108. Quoted in Nijenhuis, 
“‘To Be’ or ‘To Exist’”, 363, fn 32.  
28 Take, e.g., Thomas A F. Kelly’s contention that Aquinas’ language of esse sits unintegrated alongside “another more 
traditional view of the ascending hierarchy of actuality” (“On Remembering and Forgetting Being: Aquinas, Heidegger 
and Caputo”. American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 76, no. 2 (2002): 321-40).  
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make a beginning” or “to take the initiative”. By the fifth century BCE, the verb u9pa/rxw was used 
in several poetic and prose texts not so much in the sense of “making” a beginning (i.e., in 
conjunction with poiei=n), but rather of being a beginning in its own right, and in this way of 
speaking there is a strong convergence between u9pa/rxein and ei]nai itself, both carrying the 
connotation of availability or being on-hand.29 However, what u9pa/rxw adds to ei]nai is 
temporality, originally in the direction of past emergence, but eventually also encompassing the 
idea of present actuality, though even here generally retaining the broader context of temporal 
situatedness.30  
 
Evidence for a “hardening” of the various “quasi-existential” uses of u9pa/rxein into a fixed term 
that is discrete from ei]nai and its cognates appears as early as the generation after Aristotle’s death, 
and by the Roman era, u3parcij was being used as an abstract substantive form. Indeed, Kahn goes 
as far as to say that the difference between essence and existence was already in place in Hellenistic 
philosophical texts of the third century BCE, 31 and thus much earlier than is often assumed by those 
who would see it as a function of the medieval worldview of the Abrahamic religions. After all, 
once the notions of being and non-being are implicitly juxtaposed in the context of beginnings and 
thus the emergence of something that once was not, it is only the shortest of steps to a reflection 
upon the contingency of exist(ence) per se: the thatness of what is. 
 
u9pa/rxein and its cognates were often used in Hellenistic literature as roughly synonymous with 
ei]nai, though the temporal connotation of the former remained central throughout. In this way, 
u9pa/rxein is implicated in the (in)famous distinction between “being” (ei]nai) and “becoming” 
(gi/gnomai) as it was set up by Parmenides in particular, whereby the dynamism of gi/gnomai (and 
                                                 
29 Kahn, “On the Terminology for Copula and Existence”. In Islamic Philosophy and the Classical Tradition, edited by 
S.M Stern et al. London: Bruno Cassirer, 1972, 152. 
30 Kahn, “On the Terminology for Copula and Existence”, 152. 
31 Kahn, “On the Terminology for Copula and Existence”, 154. 
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thus by extension, u9pa/rxein) is distinguished from the strongly durative sense of ei]nai. 32 A very 
similar sense is evident in the Latin verb used to translate u9pa/rxein – ex(s)istere – with the 
dynamic connotations suggested by the prefix ex- (“to come out from”) alongside sistere (“to cause 
to stand firm”, derived from stare: “to stand”). To exist in this Latin sense, then, is to come-to-be, to 
emerge as something new and to thereby stand as a viable and independent entity. As Kahn points 
out, the prefix (ex-) that speaks of emergence, suggests “the completion of a process”, while the 
punctual form, sistere (i.e., the idea of momentary action) contrasts with the durative sense of 
stare.33 In this way, the substantive, ex(s)istentia – which seems to have been coined around the 
fourth century C.E. from ex(s)istere specifically in order to translate u3parcij – is precisely the 
state or result of the process of having come-to-be. Similarly, an individual ex(s)istent, which 
performs the act of ex(s)istens (the present participle of ex(s)istere), is “that which has emerged” 
through this process. Note the strong sense here of the deep ontological contingency of each 
ex(s)istent, a dimension that bears close comparison with Aquinas’ ens.  
 
Despite this pedigree, however, the fate of the language of exist(ence) throughout the medieval era 
is decidedly mixed and generally confused. The substantive, ex(s)istentia, appears to have largely 
fallen out of usage not long after it was coined. Boethius preferred esse to translate u3parcij, while 
Priscian used substantivum. While the language of exist(ence) was reclaimed in the high medieval 
period, its usage even then was far from consistent. Aquinas essentially adopted (or continued) the 
usage of Boethius, with the dynamic and emergent sense of exist(ence) being taken over into his use 
of esse, a practice which (as has been seen) had clear systematic metaphysical advantages for him.34 
                                                 
32 See Kahn, “The Greek Verb ‘to Be’ and the Concept of Being”. Foundations of Language 2, 1966, 255. 
33 Kahn, “The Greek Verb ‘to Be’, 256. 
34 There is one fascinating exception to this rule in the Thomist corpus that Nijenhuis does not mention. A quick search 
of the Index Thomisticus lists a single case (in an opuscula in response to Johannes de Vercellis) of Aquinas’ use of the 
expression, “actus existendi” (act of existence): “Quod vero quadragesimo septimo dicitur, actus existendi triplex est: 
quidam omnino potentiae impermixtus, ut esse divinum; alius semper potentiae permixtus, tale est rerum generabilium; 
tertius modo medio se habens: est enim potentiae permixtus inquantum est ab alio; partim vero non, inquantum est 
simplex et simul totus completus, et tale est esse Angeli, sanum potest habere intellectum” (De 108 articulis, q. 47). 
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Yet it was Duns Scotus rather than Aquinas who established the usage subsequently bequeathed to 
modernity in his distinction (inspired by Ibn Sīnā and passed on to later figures such as Henry of 
Ghent) between between esse essentia and esse existentiae.  
 
In turning to the modern era, then, there is a strange paradox concerning the fate of the language of 
exist(ence). On one hand, it survived, and further (by virtue of the early modern predominance of 
the Scotist over the Thomist formula) it did so largely in terms of a couplet involving essential and 
existential being respectively. Yet on the other hand, while it survived linguistically, it also 
underwent a striking delimitation in its semantic field by which the dynamic, temporal and 
emergent sense of u9pa/rxein and existere was lost, even as the kindred qualities of Aquinas’ esse 
failed to be translated into early modern ontology. The result was twofold. First, the theme of 
emergence and ontological contingency in metaphysics was decidedly dissipated as neither of the 
two alternative means by which it had been expressed –existere and/or esse – continued to carry this 
sense. Second, now shed of these connotations, the whole raison d’être of the language of 
exist(ence) vis-à-vis the language of being was quite lost, and this is, I would suggest, the historical 
context for the strange afterlife of exist(ence) in modern philosophical texts where the word is used 
as a quite superfluous synonym for being.35  
 
In light of this brief survey, I wish to make a three brief comments concerning the Nijenhuis thesis 
considered earlier. First: While Nijenhuis is largely correct to point to the contemporary sense of 
exist(ence) as indicating mere “thereness” or bland actuality, it is crucial to note that this current 
situation has a very long history, and that it certainly was not always thus. To the contrary, there is 
evidence that the Greek and Latin precursors of contemporary exist(ence) language contain much 
that he considers to be rather native to the medieval language of being (esse). Consequently, his 
                                                 
35 In his “‘To Be or ‘To Exist’” (359-362), Nijenhuis provides a useful overview of this practice of “clumsy, 
unnecessary, or tautological” uses of being and exist(ence) language in a survey of texts by Locke, Hume, Descartes 
and Kant.  
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comment that in comparison with the Indo-European verbs “to be” exsist(ere) has a “rather dull 
origin” in the mere conflation of ex and sistere,36 rings decidedly hollow. It is of course true that the 
verb “to be” has an etymologically more diverse pedigree than the verb “to exist” (being related to 
ancient Indo-European roots with senses as diverse as living, being true, being real, emerging, 
growing and abiding) and that it functions across a hugely more diverse semantic range (having 
predicational, identificational, copulative as well as existential and other functions). However, as an 
historic marker of the depth dimension of actuality, there is absolutely nothing “dull” or flat about 
exist(ence).  
 
Second: It is perhaps telling that Nijenhuis’ etymological excursions rarely venture back behind the 
Latin terminology of being and exist(ence) to the Greek precursors, since in this way he misses the 
temporal dynamism and emergent sense of u9pa/rxein and its progeny. But even given this 
omission, Nijenhuis’ declaration of the self-evident metaphysical poverty or flatness of 
existere/existentia, is still somewhat surprising, for even the Latin etymology – of which he makes 
specific reference – provides a clear glimpse of precisely this sense. At one point, for example, he 
claims that for Aquinas esse means “to stand out of (be removed from) nothingness”, and then 
acknowledges in a footnote the “irony” of understanding esse in this sense given that “this 
definition is couched in terms reminiscent of the classical ex(s)istere”. 37 Indeed! In any case, even 
while identifying the emergent sense of existere, Nijenhuis’ interpretive emphasis clearly falls much 
more on “-sistere” (“being at a stand”) than on the active and dynamic sense of the “ex-“ (the 
coming-out-of ). 
 
Third: Nijenhuis’ contention that exist(ence) is a matter of the mere “thereness” of things, leads him 
to conclude that “the ‘existence’ of things is perceived by the senses” which is a matter only of 
                                                 
36 See Nijenhuis, “‘Ens’ Described as ‘Being or Existent’”, 2 and “Existence vs. Being”, 92. 
37 Nijenhuis, “‘To Be’ or ‘To Exist’”, 365 and fn 35. 
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empirical noticing by which things are considered “from the outside”; whereas the investigation of 
the “be-ing” of things “is a matter for the intellect” by which “we look into them, examine their 
inside”, and in this way engage in metaphysics per se.38 The foregoing analysis of the historical 
semantic field of exist(ence), shows that any such neat demarcation between the acts of recognising 
the existing and be-ing of things is unsustainable. True, that a being exists (or not) is something 
perceived by the senses. But this sight becomes metaphysical insight to the extent that the 
underlying truth uncovered by such perception is the act by and through which the being exists. 
There is a major difference between just noticing that something exists, and metaphysically 
contemplating its existing.  
 
Concluding Remarks: Exist(ence), Thomism and Contemporary Metaphysics 
In this paper I have responded to Nijenhuis’ thesis along several lines. On one hand, I have agreed 
that one cannot simply slide between the language of being and exist(ence) as if they were 
synonymous; and further, I have given a qualified but sympathetic account of his reading of 
Thomist metaphysics by which it would appear that the practice of substituting exist(ence) for esse 
seriously distorts the presentation of Aquinas’ own distinctive vision of creation. On the other hand, 
I have argued against Nijenhuis’ dismissal of the depth and richness of the language of exist(ence) 
per se, suggesting that much of the dynamic and emergent quality that is central to Aquinas’ notion 
of esse is equally to be found in the traditional language of exist(ence), even if the sense of 
graduated levels of fullness is not as clearly apparent. In the time remaining I wish to conclude with 
a few brief remarks on what I see as perhaps the most pressing question raised by this position: i.e., 
concerning the relationship between exegesis of Thomist texts and the furthering of contemporary 
metaphysical ontology in general.  
 
                                                 
38 Nijenhuis, Existence vs. Being, 92. 
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Central to the account I have given here of the development in western thought of the idea of 
exist(ence) in its depth dimension, is the contention that there have been various ways in which this 
idea has been deployed. The genius of Aquinas’ approach was to bring the insight of existential 
contingency back within the category of “to be” itself, and in an extraordinarily theologically-
productive way, to integrate this with a theory of essence. In making such a statement it is clear that 
I am suggesting a degree of inspired contrivance on Aquinas’ part to pull the threads together in 
quite this way. Nijenhuis himself provides what I think is a fine glimpse into something like this 
process in action in noting a small liberty Aquinas took in his commentary on Boethius’ De 
Hebdomadibus. While closely paraphrasing a sentence from Boethius’ text that includes a rare use 
of the term existere, Aquinas simply replaced “existere” with “esse”. Nijenhuis finds this “curious 
enough”.39 But far from a mere curiosity, does not this provide a telling example of the relative 
contingency of such linguistic choices as means of expressing central concerns? A similar point can 
be made using either the language of exist(ence) or of being, the eventual decision being dictated 
much more by systematic concerns than by the precise semantic fields of the terms themselves.  
 
My argument here is that the language of western metaphysics is not to be uncritically conflated 
with the canonical way it is defined and deployed by individuals within the tradition, even the 
towering figure of Thomas Aquinas. When such conflation is avoided, this has the effect of freeing 
up the key insights of the western tradition to a broader range of mindsets than would otherwise be 
the case. There is, I would contend, a real danger of locking up the insight into the depth-dimension 
of exist(ence) within the Thomist paradigm alone, for if the latter is rejected (as will inevitably be 
the case at some point), the former can so easily be disregarded along with it. And this is, I submit, 
precisely what has happened over the last century via the purported “Destruktion” and 
“deconstruction” of metaphysical ontology in general. 
                                                 
39 Nijenhuis, “‘To Be or ‘To Exist’”, 357. 
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A prime case in point is the parlous state of the dialogue (such as it still is) between Thomists and 
Heideggerians. Here is a debate that, in my judgement, could only ever gain real traction to the 
extent that it focused unrelentingly on the idea of exist(ence). As I have argued elsewhere,40 for all 
his telling insights that have greatly enriched contemporary metaphysics, Heidegger – and much 
subsequent Continental philosophy that has followed in his wake – is much the poorer for its 
blindness to the idea of exist(ence) as I have tried to sketch it here today. In conceiving of 
metaphysical exist(ence) only in terms of that which is “vorhanden”, Heidegger strongly rejected 
the priority of this category, and in so doing he engaged in a wholesale redeployment of this 
terminology by which it becomes the name for a quite distinct idea at the heart of his own rival 
“fundamental ontology”. There is much at stake in this matter: viz, the very idea of existential (as 
distinct from semantic) contingency. However, insofar as the category of exist(ence) is inextricably 
(if also ambiguously) tied into the category of esse, the Thomist tradition – which in all other senses 
is the richest source available for a nuanced appreciation of this depth dimension – is rather 
hamstrung in presenting a powerful dissenting case. The conversation is inevitably sidelined into an 
all-or-nothing confrontation between Aquinas’ esse and Heidegger’s Sein, and the result of such a 
clash is predicable: stalemate and the discontinuation of the conversation. 
 
In sum: what is needed, I suggest, is that parallel with greater sensitivity to the esse-existere 
difference in Thomist texts themselves, is a heightened appreciation of the general heritage of 
existential metaphysical language, not only as an historical influence on Thomistic thought, but as a 
key resource for a revival in contemporary metaphysical ontology. Nijenhuis’ legitimate caveat 
concerning the understanding of Aquinas need not and should not determine the options open to 
current thought in its attempt to reclaim the deepest insights of the western metaphysical tradition.  
 
                                                 
40 Citation suppressed  
